

## Message Text

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ACTION EA-10

INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 ISO-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-03 H-01

INR-07 L-02 NSAE-00 NSC-05 PA-01 RSC-01 PRS-01 SP-02

SS-15 USIA-06 OMB-01 SAJ-01 NIC-01 IO-10 SAM-01

ACDA-05 NSCE-00 /086 W

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R 280700Z JAN 75

FM USLO PEKING

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3144

INFO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

AMEMBASSY TAIPEI

AMEMBASSY TOKYO

AMCONSUL HONG KONG

CINCPAC

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 2 PEKING 0141

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PINT, CH

SUBJECT: COMMENTS BY SOVIET MINISTER-COUNSELOR ON PRC'S  
FOURTH NATIONAL PEOPLE'S CONGRESS

CINCPAC FOR POLAD

REF: PEKING 0094; PEKING 0095 (NOTAL); PEKING 0109 (NOTAL)

SUMMARY. SOVIET MINISTER-COUNSELOR IN PEKING BREZHNEV CLAIMS  
MAO TSE-TUNG WAS DISSATISFIED OVER OUTCOME OF PRC'S RECENTLY  
CONCLUDED NATIONAL PEOPLE'S CONGRESS (NPC) DUE TO EXCLUSION OF  
MAO'S WIFE CHIANG CH'ING FROM POSITION OF GOVERNMENTAL AUTHORITY  
AND TO NEW CONSTITUTION'S INCLUSION OF IDEOLOGICAL PRECEPTS  
AT VARIANCE WITH MAO'S OWN. BREZHNEV THUS FORESEES A CONFRONTATION  
BETWEEN MAO AND GROUP OF "LEFTIST" SUPPORTERS AND MORE  
MODERATE ELEMENTS RESPONSIVE TO CHOU EN-LAI. BREZHNEV REGARDS NEW  
MINISTER OF PUBLIC SECURITY HUA KUO-FENG, IN WHOSE HANDS  
NEW CONSTITUTION PLACES GREAT POWER, AS MAO'S MAN. IN  
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BREZHNEV'S OPINION, PRC FOREIGN POLICY WITH ITS ACCENT ON

EXPLOITING WORLD CONTRADICTIONS IS MORE COMPATIBLE WITH MAO'S VIEWS THAN IS DOMESTIC POLICY. CHOU EN-LAI'S REPORT TO THE NPC IMPRESSED BREZHNEV AS SETTING THREE MAIN OBJECTIVES FOR CHINA: ASSURING CHINA'S SECURITY, PROMOTING CHINA'S ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, AND GAINING WORLD POSITION FOR CHINA AS A SUPERPOWER DESPITE PROFESSIONS TO THE CONTRARY. BREZHNEV BELIEVES SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS WILL REMAIN "FROZEN." THIS ANALYSIS IN USLO'S OPINION CONFORMS WITH TRADITIONAL VIEW OF USSR EMBASSY HERE TO EFFECT CHINA IS HEADED FOR INEVITABLE CONFRONTATION BETWEEN OPPOSING ELEMENTS AMONG TOP PRC LEADERSHIP. END SUMMARY.

1. AT INDIAN NATIONAL DAY JANUARY 24, DC HOLDRIDGE HAD OPPORTUNITY TO TALK BRIEFLY WITH SOVIET MINISTER-COUNSELOR BREZHNEV ON

SUBJECT OF PRC'S RECENTLY CONCLUDED FOURTH NATIONAL PEOPLE'S CONGRESS. BREZHNEV VOLUNTEERED TO GO INTO THIS SUBJECT IN GREATER DETAIL AT LATER DATE, AND DC MADE APPOINTMENT TO CALL ON BREZHNEV AT SOVIET EMBASSY ON JANUARY 27. FOLLOWING ARE HIGHLIGHTS OF BREZHNEV'S ANALYSIS:

2. BREZHNEV MAINTAINS THAT SERIOUS DIFFERENCES BETWEEN TWO ELEMENTS OF TOP PRC LEADERSHIP ON POLICY HAD EXISTED PRIOR TO CONVENING OF NPC, AND THAT THESE DIFFERENCES HAD NOT BEEN RECONCILED. HE FURTHER MAINTAINED THAT MAO TSE-TUNG WAS NOT SATISFIED WITH NPC OUTCOME. ACCORDINGLY, SITUATION WAS "PREGNANT" AND POSSIBILITY EXISTED OF CONFRONTATION BETWEEN MAO AND MAO'S SUPPORTERS VS CHOU EN-LAI AND CHOU'S SUPPORTERS.

3. BREZHNEV GAVE NO EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THESIS THAT SERIOUS DISAGREEMENTS HAD EXISTED WITHIN TOP LEADERSHIP, BUT SAID THAT MAO'S DISSATISFACTION WITH NPC DOCUMENTS AND OUTCOME COULD BE DISCERNED FROM (A) FACT THAT MAO REMAINED AWAY FROM PEKING DURING BOTH SECOND PLENUM OF TENTH CCP CENTRAL COMMITTEE AND FOURTH NPC, AND EVEN RECEIVED FOREIGN VISITORS DURING THIS TIME; (B) THERE WAS NO STATEMENT FROM MAO EITHER DURING OR SUBSEQUENT TO NPC EXPRESSING MAO'S SUPPORT FOR EITHER ITS DOCUMENTS OR ITS RESULTS; (C) NO CELEBRATION OCCURRED IN PEKING TO HONOR CONCLUSION OF NPC OTHER THAN ILLUMINATION OF CONFIDENTIAL

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PUBLIC BUILDINGS; (D) THERE HAS BEEN NO SUBSEQUENT PEOPLE'S DAILY EDITORIAL ACCLAIMING NPC'S "SUCCESS."

4. IN BREZHNEV'S OPINION, MAO'S DISSATISFACTION WOULD BE FOCUSED ON TWO ASPECTS OF NPC: FAILURE OF MAO'S WIFE CHIANG CH'ING TO RECEIVE POSITION IN PRC GOVERNMENT, WHICH CHIANG CH'ING HAD CLEARLY WANTED; AND IDEOLOGICAL POSITIONS TAKEN IN NEW PRC CONSTITUTION WHICH CONTRADICTED MAO'S LONG-STANDING PERSONAL PREFER-

ENCES. IN LATTER RESPECT, BREZHNEV CITED ESTABLISHMENT OF  
PRTJUCTION TEAM RATHER THAN COMMUNE ITSELF AS BASIC  
ACCOUNTING UNIT, AND DECLARATION OF ARTICLE 9 OF CONSTITUTION THAT  
REMUNERATION SHOULD BE "FROM EACH ACCORDING TO HIS ABILITY, TO  
EACH ACCORDING TO HIS WORK" INSTEAD OF "FROM EACH ACCORDING TO HIS  
ABILITY, TO EACH ACCORDING TO HIS NEED." BREZHNEV RECALLED THAT  
IN 1958 MAO HAD CALLED FOR THE THEN LARGE-SIZED COMMUNE TO BE LOWEST  
LEVEL BASIC ECONOMIC UNIT AND HAD ACCLAIMED PRINCIPLE OF "TO EACH ACCORD-

ING TO HIS NEED" -- ONE OF MAJOR ELEMENTS IN DEVELOPMENT OF SINO-  
SOVIET POLEMIC.

5. RETURNING TO THESIS OF POSSIBLE FUTURE CONFRONTATIONS AMONG  
ELEMENTS OF LEADERSHIP, BREZHNEV CITED APPOINTMENT OF HUA KUO-FENG  
AS MINISTER OF PUBLIC SECURITY AS CASE IN POINT. BREZHNEV  
ARGUED THAT WITH ABOLITION OF PROCURATORSHIP, MINISTRY OF  
PUBLIC SECURITY NOW BECAME PRC'S STRONGEST INSTRUMENT OF  
CENTRAL CONTROL, BUT HUA KUO-FENG, IN BREZHNEV'S OPINION, HAD LONG  
BEEN IDENTIFIED AS A MAO TSE-TUNG SUPPORTER. BREZHNEV THUS SAW  
MINISTRY OF PUBLIC SECURITY BEING USED BY MAO AND SUPPORTERS AGAINST  
OTHER LEADERS MORE RESPONSIVE TO CHOU EN-LAI (HOWEVER, BREZHNEV LATER  
IN CONVERSATION TENDED TO CONTRADICT HIS OWN THEORY BY  
REFERRING TO FACT THAT HUA KUO-FENG HAD BEEN SUBJECTED TO  
HEAVY POSTER ATTACK IN CHANGSHA LAST SUMMER, PRESUMABLY AT  
HANDS OF DISSATISFIED LEFTISTS.)  
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6. ALSO IN SOMEWHAT CONTRADICTORY FASHION, BREZHNEV SAID THAT IN HIS PERSONAL OPINION ONE OF MOST IMPORTANT RESULTS OF NPC WAS RISE IN IMPORTANCE OF LEADERS WHOSE MAIN EXPERIENCE HAD BEEN IN PROVINCES RATHER THAN IN PEKING. HE FELT THAT THESE WOULD HAVE A BETTER CONCEPT THAN LATTER OF WHAT WAS FEASIBLE AND WHAT WAS NOT, AND BEING IN THEIR 60'S THEY WOULD FORM A BRIDGE BETWEEN PRESENT GENERATION OF LEADERS NOW IN THEIR 70'S AND THE YOUNGER PEOPLE COMING ALONG. BREZHNEV IN ADDITION POINTED OUT FACT THAT EIGHT OUT OF TWELVE STATE COUNCIL VICE-PREMIERS ARE POLITBURO MEMBERS, TAKING THIS AS SIGN OF TIGHTENED PARTY CONTROL. HE DID NOT DISPUTE CONCEPT PUT FOWARD BY DC THAT LEADERS WTIH PRACTICAL PROVINCIAL BACKGROUND MIGHT BE LESS RATHER THAN MORE DISPOSED TO SEE SIGNIFICANT DEGREE OF INTERNAL POLITICAL STRUGGLE, AND HENCE MORE TO THE RIGHT THAN TO THE LEFT OF POLITICAL SPECTRUM.  
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7. WHEN DEC SPECULATED THAT MAO'S ADVANCED AGE AND POSSIBLE FRAILITY MIGHT UNDERCUT MAO'S ABILITY TO LAUNCH A COUNTERATTACK IN CONFRONTATION SITUATION SUCH AS BREZHNEV HAD DESCRIBED, BREZHNEV TOOK POSITION THAT IF SUCH WERE INDEED THE CASE, MAO WOULD HAVE TO ACT SOONER RATHER THAN LATER. HE AGREED THAT HISTORICALLY MAO AND CHOU HAD GIVEN APPEARANCE OF WORKING CLOSELY TOGETHER, BUT CLAIMED THAT BELOW THE SURFACE CHOU HAD NEVERTHELESS ON OCCASION TAKEN POSITIONS CONTRARY TO MAO'S WISHES WHILE SUPPORTING MAO IN WORDS.

8. ON BASIS OF CHOU EN-LAI'S REPORT TO THE NPC, BREZHNEV FELT THAT PRC'S PRIMARY OBJECTIVES WERE, FIRST, TO ASSURE CHINA'S SECURITY; SECOND, TO ESTABLISH AND MAINTAIN GOOD ECONOMIC RELATIONS WITH OTHER COUNTRIES SO AS TO PROMOTE CHINA'S CONTINUED ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT; AND, THIRD, TO GAIN A WORLD POSITION FOR CHINA AS ONE OF THE SUPERPOWERS DESPITE ALL DISCLAIMERS TO THE CONTRARY. BREZHNEV SAW NO POSSIBILITY OF CHINA ATTAINING GOAL SET BY CHOU EN-LAI OF CATCHING UP WITH THE ADVANCED INDUSTRIAL COUNTRIES OF THE WEST BY THE YEAR 2000, SAYING THAT AT CHINA'S PRESENT RATE OF POPULATION GROWTH, BY END OF THE CENTURY IT WOULD GAIN POPULATION EQUAL TO THAT OF USSR TODAY AND WOULD STRAIN ITS CAPACITIES JUST

TO TAKE CARE OF THIS INCREASE MUCH LESS MEET THE NEEDS OF  
REMAINING 800 MILLION-PLUS PEOPLE.

9. IN FOREIGN POLICY, BREZHNEV THOUGHT THAT LINE LAID DOWN BY  
CHOU EN-LAI CAME CLOSER TO MAO TSE-TUNG'S PERSONAL INCLINATIONS THAN  
DID PRC DOMESTIC POLICY. MAO TRADITIONALLY WAS A BELIEVER IN  
CAPITALIZING UPON CONTRADICTIONS, AND THIS WAS WHAT CHOU EN-LAI  
WAS IN EFFECT CALLING FOR IN OUTLINING CONTRADICTIONS BETWEEN  
SOVIET UNION AND WESTERN EUROPE, WE AND US, THIRD WORLD AND  
SUPERPOWERS, ETC. IN PRACTICAL TERMS, BREZHNEV SAW NO CHANGE  
IN PRESENT PATTERN OF PRC-USSR RELATIONS, WHICH WOULD REMAIN  
"FROZEN," AND HE DOUBTED THAT CHINESE NECESSARILY ANTICIPATED  
OUTBREAK OF NEW WORLD WAR. HE FELT THAT IN ANY EVENT, CHINESE  
CLEARLY WOULD NOT WANT A WAR. HE AGREED WITH SURMISE BY DC THAT ONE  
PURPOSE CHOUNDN-LAI HAD IN RAISING THREAT OF WAR WAS TO DOWNGRADE  
HOPES FOR A DETENTE. DETENTE, HE SAID, RAN CONTRARY TO  
CHINA'S INTERESTS AS THEY ARE NOW VIEWED BECAUSE IT WOULD  
REDUCE THE CONTRADICTIONS WHICH CHINESE WERE TRYING TO EXPLOIT.

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10. COMMENT: SOVIETS IN PEKING HAVE LONG BEEN WEDDED TO THESIS  
THAT SERIOUS CONTRADICTIONS EXIST BETWEEN MAO AND "LEFTISTS" ON ONE  
HAND AND LEADERSHIP GROUP HEADED BY CHOU EN-LAI ON THE OTHER WHICH  
WILL LEAD INEVITABLY TO CONFRONTATION. BREZHNEV'S ANALYSIS OF NPC  
OUTCOME FITS THIS THESIS QUITE WELL. GRANTING THAT CIRCUMSTANCES  
SURR-  
OUNDING CONVENING OF NPC WERE CURIOUS, TO SAY THE LEAST, WE  
BELIEVE SOVIETS HERE TEND TO DISCOUNT OTHER FACTORS WHICH DO  
NOT TALLY WITH THEIR ESTIMATES OF ULTIMATE  
CONFRONTATION. THEY APPEAR TO BELIEVE THERE IS LITTLE OR NOTHING  
FOR USSR IN CONTINUATION OF EXISTING STATUS QUO IN CHINA.  
BREZHNEV, INCIDENTALLY, HAS SPENT MANY YEARS IN PEKING (HE WAS  
CHARGE DURING HIGHEST OF ANTI-SOVIET CAMPAIGN IN 1967) AND IS VERY  
FAMILIAR WITH CHAPTER AND VERSE OF THE GOSPLE ACCORDING TO  
MAO TSE-TUNG. ONE FEATURE NOT RAISED IN ANY DETAIL BY  
BREZHNEV WAS HIS ESTIMATE OF ROLE OF MILITARY IN PRESENT  
POWER BALANCE. THIS POINT WILL BE DISCUSSED WITH HIM AT FIRST  
OPPORTUNITY.  
HOLDRIDGE

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